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Police unionism in Atlanta has received considerable
editorial attention by Atlanta local news media. The need
for collective bargaining rights has been uppermost in the
minds of the police union members and other labor activists.
However, opposition to such demands has been an ongoing trend,
making it necessary for the writer to evaluate the percep
tions of selected individuals of the Atlanta city government
on the potential impact of collective bargaining in Atlanta
Police Department. Regardless of the law prohibiting strikes
by public safety employees, strikes do occur. As a result,
the writer notes that collective bargaining should not be
synonymous with strikes. The writer also learned that there
is an absence of a statutory provision authorising collective
bargaining in Atlanta Police Department.
The significance of this study lies in its attempt
through research, to devise a harmonious working relationship
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between the police, the city government and the local resi
dents. The study concludes that the benefits of police
collective bargaining in Atlanta outweigh whatever may be
potential negative impacts. This study, therefore,
advises the City of Atlanta to enact an ordinance allowing
collective bargaining in its police department.
Information obtained from interviews formed the
primary data source, while literature review obtained from





Statement of the Problem 3
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 5
III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 8
IV. METHODOLOGY 30
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 32





Since the 1960s, public management of human resources
has been experiencing radical changes. The widespread adop
tion of collective bargaining in law enforcement is one of
the most visible of those changes. The government enacts
appropriate legislation governing collective bargaining.
However, collective bargaining can be widespread in a given
jurisdiction without enabling legislation. Initiating col
lective bargaining legislation in a city can be a disquieting
experience, especially in a conservative southern city where
existing personnel policies are vague.
During the researcher's internship with the Georgia
State Employees Association, Local 1985, in 1986, several
research-oriented problems involving management-labor rela
tions were assigned to him. The researcher learned that
there are no collective bargaining rights guaranteed by law
for Georgia public employees, except the Fire Fighters'
Mediation Act of 1971, which allows local governments that
elect coverage to enact local legislation establishing col
lective bargaining in the fire department.
After reading extensively on the subject of collec
tive bargaining, the writer developed an interest in this
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area and thus decided to examine the status of public
employee rights in the Public Safety Department of the
City of Atlanta.
Collective bargaining is one of the key personnel
matters that is concerned with industrial harmony. Despite
government's concern for peace and harmony, its inability
to accept certain union demands creates an adverse relation
ship between itself and labor which the public manager often
finds most troublesome to resolve unilaterally. Besides its
adversarial process, collective bargaining thrives best when
both sides win or agree. Often, this means finding an accept
able agreement between the extremes of both sides. As a
result, the essence of collective bargaining is negotiation in
good faith which aims at achieving a bilaterally arrived
compromise between the two parties in conflict.
Although the International Brotherhood of Police
Officers (IBPO) - the local labor union representing the
Atlanta Police Union - has been recognized by the Atlanta
City Council, its effectiveness in representing the interest
of its members is hampered by the current absence of a statu
tory provision authorizing collective bargaining in the
Atlanta Police Department.
It is the intent of this degree paper to evaluate the
perceptions of the interviewees on the potential impact of
collective bargaining in Atlanta Police Department. A
secondary objective is to examine the role the IBPO has
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played since its inception and how effective the meet-and-
confer approach has been in reducing the police union's job
actions.
Statement of the Problem
The growth of police unionism in Atlanta is a pheno
menon of considerable importance in law enforcement. Tradi
tionally, the city government has made all decisions regard
ing labor policies. At times this has led to crisis and
subsequent development of trade unionism within the police
department. The crux of the problem is that there are no
existing collective bargaining rights within the City of
Atlanta Police Department. The City of Atlanta, therefore,
employed meet-and-confer as a substitute for collective bar
gaining.
The meet-and-confer arrangement permits the parties
to discuss issues of employment and, if agreement
is reached, a memorandum of understanding is issued.
But there is no legal obligation on the part of the
employer, either to enter into such discussions or
to comply with any resulting understanding.^
Much of the literature on public sector labor relations sup
ports the view that a meet-and-confer arrangement is an in
sufficient alternative to collective bargaining. The meet-
and-confer relationship has not helped solve the emerging
llmar F. Forouk and Kirk V. Roy, "Legal Context of
Public Sector Labor Relations." In Handbook on Public Per
sonnel Administration and Labor Relations, Jack Rabin; Thomas
Vocino; Bartley Hildreth; and Gerald Miller, eds., (New York:
Marcel Dekker, Inc., 1983), 314.
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problems associated with issues relating to the merit
system, compensation, promotion, grievance procedures,
management, seniority, and eventual dismissal of police
officers. As a result, there is less than a cooperative
relationship between the city and the police, thus compro
mising the effectiveness of public safety activities in
Atlanta. Because of the inherent limits of a meet-and-confer
system and its disadvantage of unilateralism to the police
union, collective bargaining will make it possible for
employees to participate in determining terms and conditions
of employment. It will better assure equity and fair play,
and contribute to better working relationships and bilateral
decision making.
This degree paper intends, therefore, to examine the
above aspects of the problem and evaluate the perceptions of
selected individuals of Atlanta city government on the poten
tial impact of collective bargaining in the Atlanta Police
Department.
II. THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING
The problem was formulated in response to many indi
viduals, including the members of the Atlanta Police Union
who have been actively engaged in vigorous efforts to bring
about a collective bargaining right in Atlanta Police
Department. There is an atmosphere of suspicion and untrust-
worthiness in the Atlanta Police Department. The politics
of running the police department without adequate input by
the police union is a serious problem that needs to be
addressed. Inadequate police salaries, loss of status and
prestige, poor perception of police community relations, mass
exodus of trained officers, and the increased difficulties of
police work are the causes of police unionization. These are
problems to be solved by collective bargaining - the only
sure way to remove the roots of police dissatisfaction with
their employment.
It is important to note that collective bargaining
can enhance working relationships among the police, the city
government, and the local residents. While a majority of
the police officers are in favor of collective bargaining
rights, the remaining members of the force are skeptical of
union officials' ability to represent and act on their stated
5
6
views. The writer learned that the IBPO has been seeking
to gain the right to bargain collectively since 19 85. The
meet-and-confer system through which the police union can
relate their problems to the city administration was won
after an intense and costly court battle, yet it has not
proven to be a strong medium of relationship.
It is noteworthy that the question of collective
bargaining is extremely salient among policy-makers in this
city. Issues pertaining to labor problems between the City
of Atlanta and its police union had received considerable
editorial opinions from major local news media since the
19 60s. The antagonisms created between the city and its
police union in their continuous battle for union recogni
tion, a meet-and-confer agreement, and dues check-off,
resulted in a relationship that fostered mistrust, victimi
zation, fear and alienation of the police from members
of the entire society. Violence, harassment, and the use
of deadly force are characteristics of the police-community
relations. The recent episode of police shooting at Carver
Homes is an example. There is a great need for the City of
Atlanta to restore confidence in the Police Department and
reassure the police union of its commitment by developing
formal contractual labor agreement.
Interviews held with key officials of the Atlanta
city government showed that a majority of the police officers
are not satisfied with the present administrative policies
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and are suffering from alienation. The police are not the
only group affected by these problems. The firefighters
want to formalize their collective bargaining agreement with
a written contract.
III. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The growing strength of public sector unionism and
the quest for collective bargaining rights by police unions
since the early 1960s have caused considerable dispute
between employee unions and public employers. Despite
decades of controversy, several jurisdictions are yet unde
cided on whether the police should be allowed to bargain
collectively with the government employer. Progressive
local governments are taking a new look at collective bar
gaining to ascertain how it will actually improve manage
ment labor relations without interfering with the efficiency
of service delivery.
For a better understanding of the concept of public
sector unionism, it is pertinent to define the basic term
under consideration. The Taft-Hartley Act defines collec
tive bargaining as
The mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet and
confer in good faith with respect to wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employ
ment and the execution of a written contract
incorporating any written agreement reached ....2
2
Charles Maddox, Collective Bargaining in Law
Enforcement (Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1975), 4.
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There is no generally accepted definition of collec
tive bargaining in the public sector. This is primarily
because public sector bargaining laws vary among jurisdic
tions. Summer H. Slichter defined collective bargaining
as being divided into two basic functions: 1) A method of
establishing the price of labor, and as a method of building
up a system of industrial jurisprudence. From the above
definition, one can infer that collective bargaining allows
employee unions and their employers the opportunity to bar
gain over wages and to ensure a harmonious working relation
ship.
Robert Montilla states the meaning of collective
bargaining as "a joint determination of the conditions of
4
employment by representatives of employers and employees."
Dissatisfied with the above definition, Montilla
defines collective bargaining as
a process whereby employees as a group and their
employers make offers and counter-offers in good
faith on the conditions of their employment rela
tionship for the purpose of reaching a mutually
acceptable agreement, and the execution of a written
document incorporating any such agreement if re
quested by either party.5
Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies on Industrial
Management (Menasha, WI: George Banta Publishing Co., 1942),
4.
4
Robert M. Montilla, Prison Employee Unionism:
Management Guide for Correctional Administrators (Washing
ton, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, January 1973), 3.
5Ibid.
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However, since a generally acceptable definition has not
yet emerged, Yancy's definition of collective bargaining in
the public sector will be adopted as the operational defini
tion for this paper. Yancy defines collective bargaining
as
negotiations between employer and labor repre
sentatives on wages, working conditions, grie
vances, and other matters affecting the working
conditions,of the employees, culminating in a
bilaterally arrived at oral or written agreement
which may or may not be binding. 6
The above definitions closely approximate a general
agreement on the meaning of public sector collective bar
gaining - a method of determining terms and conditions of
employment by negotiation between representatives of labor
and management.
Most of the early literature on police unionization
and collective bargaining is concerned primarily with salary
increases and strikes. This section reviews a portion of
the existing literature on the impact of public sector col
lective bargaining, including the conceptual and actual
obstacles to full adoption of collective bargaining. A
major factor that impedes labor relations in the bureau of
police services of most cities is a lack of collective
ordinance. In the less industrialized southern states, the
Dorothy Cowser Yancy, "The Spectre of Public Unionism
from 1966 to 1976: A Critical Analysis of Labor Policies of
the City of Atlanta." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Atlanta
University, May 1978, 24.
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legislative response to collective bargaining in the public
sector has been very negative. Some of these states are
Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
7
Carolina, Georgia and Virginia.
The 1960s, however, saw the dramatic expansion of
p
public sector labor legislation in a number of states. It
is no longer a matter of discussion, but a reality, that
collective bargaining is fast becoming institutionalized in
law enforcement. This means that most law enforcement
agencies have regard for, and accord their employees basic
social justice. Unlike before, government employers are
rejecting paternalism and accepting bilateral decision making
with their organized police unions—some of the rights which
other citizens have been enjoying several years in the past.
As a consequence, there have been frequent and signi
ficant shifts in effective decision-making authority on
personnel matters, changes in the distribution of political
and policy influence, and on occasion, very visible implica-
9
tions for the delivery of the most essential public services.
7For details, see Lon Felker, "Public Sector Rela
tions in the States and Municipalities: The Impact of Union
Legislative Environment," Public Personnel Management, Vol.
15, No. 1 (Spring 1986):45.
8Ibid., 43.
9George J. Gordon, Public Administration in America,
2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1982), 342.
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It should be noted that collective bargaining was
adopted in the United States' public sector, upon the frank
acceptance of democratic capitalism and the desire to
improve the workers1 status under the same economic system.
The notion of collective bargaining is rooted in our modern
concept of democracy, the interaction of influences within
our political, economic and social environment. John Wynne,
noting the causes of unionization in the public sector,
states that those causes can be summarized as (1) em
ployer's refusal to recognize individual employee's demand
without a collective voice; (2) the employees' efforts to
improve their earning power; (3) the influence of private
sector bargaining; (4) the ready assistance of national
unions; (5) the effect of Executive Order 10988; and (6)
the conservative and unilateral attitudes of employers.
Historical Perspective
Juris and Feuille indicated that the
early police organizations were formed between
1890 and 1915, which lobbied with employers for
increased wages, provided welfare insurance and
death benefits, and offered members the chance
to engage in social and fraternal activities.H
For a greater detail of the causes of public
sector unionization, see John M. Wynne, Jr. Prison Employee
Unionism: The Impact of Correctional Administration and
Programs (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice,
January 1978), 49-51.
i;i"Hervey Juris and Peter Feuille, The Impact of
Police Unions: Summary Report (Washington, D.C.: Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1973), 64.
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However, it was not until the early 1960s that collective
bargaining played a major part in public personnel adminis
tration. "Public employees realized that they were a major
presence, and they decided that they no longer would tole-
12
rate a status inferior to that of private workers."
The executive order passed by New York City's Mayor
Robert F. Wagner in 1958, triggered this re-awakening. The
executive order granted public employees the right to
participate, to the extent allowed by law, through
their freely chosen representatives in the deter
mination of the terms and conditions of their
employment. 1^
The order provides that city government would
further and promote, in so far as possible, the
practice and procedures of collective bargaining
in accordance with the patterns prevailing in
private labor relations.14
In 1959, Wisconsin became the first state to enact legisla
tion of this kind; it did so by passing a statute requiring
15
municipalities to negotiate with their employees. It also
devised a comprehensive plan for collective bargaining and
established the bargaining unit structure in the enabling
Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro, The New Public
Personnel Administration (Itasca, IL: F. E. Peacock Pub
lishers, Inc., 1981), 141.
Wynne, Prison Employee Unionism: The Impact of




act. This approach has not been emulated by many states,
even though most of its intended purposes have been )■
W * 16achieved.
With the issuance of President John F. Kennedy's
Executive Order 10988 in 1962, which grants federal em
ployees the right to collective bargaining, unionization
spread rapidly in the industrialized states of the midwest
and northeast and quickly gained a foot hold in large and
17
medium-sized cities around the United States. Since the
early 1970s, many more states and cities began to grant
collective bargaining rights to their public employee unions,
resulting in increased union membership among police offi
cers. In functional areas, 52 percent of police officers
in state and local governments belong to labor organiza-
18
tions. In the State of Ohio, for example, "an estimated
200,000 state and local government employees gained the right
19
to bargain collectively in 1985, under a 1983 law." Worker
Montilla, Prison Employee Unionism: Management
Guide for Correctional Administrators, 35. ■
Steven W. Hayes and Richard C. Kearney, Public
Personnel Administration: Problems and Prospects (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983), 195.
Felker, "Public Sector Relations in States and
Municipalities: The Impact of Union Legislative Environ
ment, "46.
David Schlein, Phyllis Brown and Fehmida Sleemi,
"Collective Bargaining During 1986: Pressures to Curb Costs
Remain," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 109, No. 1 (January 1986)
31.
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coverage by major contracts in state and local governments,
unlike private industry, has increased from two million in
20
1985 to 2.3 million in 1987.
Collective bargaining laws vary among states and
local governments. Being a restrictive state, hence lacking
a statewide comprehensive collective bargaining statute, the
only Georgia statute authorizing public sector bargaining is
the 1981 Fire Fighters' Mediation Act. The Act allows cities
that elect coverage and have 20,000 or more population, the
right to bargain collectively and be represented by a labor
organization as to wages, rates of pay, hours, working condi-
21
tions and all other terms and conditions of employment.
After a thorough review of the existing state public
labor policy, Yancy characterized the Georgia public employ
ment policy as "vague," and in violation of the spirit as well
as the letter of Executive Order 10988. The vagueness can be
illustrated with regard to the conflicting and inconsistent




21Yancy, "The Spectre of Public Unionism from 196 6
to 1976: A Critical Analysis of Labor Policies of the City
of Atlanta," 6.
22Ibid, 12-14. For details see the Attorney General's
opinions in 1966 and the Supreme Court rulings of 1974.
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In his book, Management Guide for Correctional Admin
istrators, Robert Montilla summarizes the several advantages
of collective bargaining in the public sector as follows:
1) to establish and protect employees' rights;
2) to improve working conditions and benefits;
3) to establish and maintain more harmonious
employer-employee relationships; and 4) to estab
lish a participative role for employees in manage
ment decisions which affect employees.23
This summary suggests that collective bargaining can be a
necessary process to achieve industrial harmony, hence it
is capable of enhancing the satisfaction of employees' needs.
Collective bargaining is usually initiated when a
group of workers organize into a labor union that speaks for
them on a collective voice. The union later seeks recogni
tion from management to back up its claim to represent and
speak for the employees. Overton and Wortman summarily
state the objectives of public sector collective bargaining
as follows: 1) identify the basic conflicting issues between
labor and management; 2) determine the reasons for such con
flicts; 3) enhance a rapid resolution of those labor con
flicts; 4) provide a process whereby future conflicts may be
aired and a system that will be used to resolve those con
flicts. The above objectives strongly agree with the
Montilla, Prison Employee Unionism: Management
Guide for Correctional Administrators, 2.
Craig E. Overton and Max S. Wortman, Jr. "One More
Time: What is Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector
All About?" Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Public
Sector, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1976):12.
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the recent IBPO pamphlets — "Why Unions? Why IBPO?" and
"Facts About IBPO."25
Labor specialists agree that law enforcement agencies
should not act as a feudal fiefdom where threat of undue and
forceful disciplinary actions thrive. From the standpoint of
organizational behavior, an individual's psychological needs
are much greater than economic incentives. This suggests
that alienated and frustrated employees tend to join unions
and seek collective bargaining rights. As a result of intimi
dation and the stressful nature of police service, police
unions seem to engage more in upgrading the social status
and job security of their members than advocate for economic
benefits through collective bargaining.
When unions engage in activities that promote their
well-being and continued survival, some impacts are felt.
While some may be beneficial to all concerned, others may
not be. Kearney has done several studies on the impact of
police unionization. He found that
collective bargaining misallocates both economic
and political resources; it enhances and institu
tionalizes the power of the public employee union
to such an extent that competing interest groups
may find themselves at a permanent and substantial
disadvantage.26
Unpublished handouts prepared by the IBPO (avail
able at IBPO Office, 250 Tenth Street, N.E.), Atlanta,
Georgia, n.d.
Richard Kearney, "The Impact of Police Unioniza-
tionnon Municipal Budgetary Outcomes," International Journal
of Public Administration, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1979):263.
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Kearney states that the above situation obtains because 1)
prolonged disruption of services during strikes might pose
danger to public health; 2) demand for certain governmental
services are inelastic; 3) it makes the municipal employer
27
politically vulnerable in time of strikes.
While Kearney's argument is based on the inherent
dangers of strikes, Gordon notes that
collective bargaining has obvious implications
for financial management, budgeting, personnel,
planning and for the roles of employees and
managers in the system.28
Gordon agrees with Kearney, that
collective bargaining is associated with higher
personnel costs, reduces the flexibility of the
budget-making process (especially when bargaining
overlaps budgetary periods), and creates philoso
phical conflict with the merit principles.29
He, however, sees an optimistic future for the continued
success of collective bargaining in restructuring the per
sonnel system.
While Kearney emphasizes the vulnerability of a
municipality during strikes, Richard Dole explains that
government's inflexibility, coupled with its inability to
grant collective bargaining rights to the police union, can
27Ibid., 377.
O O
Gordon, Public Administration in America, 373.
29Ibid., 373-374.
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be a major cause of several strike tactics. Theoretically,
the issues of collective bargaining and strikes are separable.
Dole maintains that "the legitimization of the former, does
not necessarily require legitimization of the latter."
Gordon warns that, although strikes are by far the most
widely reported, visible and controversial of all the various
aspects of public-sector labor-management relations, that
should not be permitted to obscure management-labor inter
actions.32 He maintains that most collective bargaining pro
cesses and outcomes do not result in strikes. Gordon's view
is based on the fact that neither collective bargaining nor
labor unionization is necessarily synonymous with public
employee strikes.
This is in contrast to Richard Freeman who states
that "strikes by public sector workers are a part of public
sector labor relations."33 The incidence of strikes tends
to be minimal in jurisdictions where strikes are legal than
3 Richar D. Role, Jr., "State and Local Public
Employee Collective Bargaining in the Absence of Explicit
Legislative Authorization." In Collective Bargaining in
Government: Readings and Cases, Joseph J. Lowenberg and




Gordon, Public Administration in America, 345.
33Richard B. Freeman, "Unionism Comes to the Public




where strikes are prohibited. The situation in Ohio is
typical. Even though Ohio statutes require that public
employee strikers be immediately jailed, the state had
seventy-eight strikes in 1979, and no one went to jail.
It is noteworthy that the objective of collective
bargaining is not to strike. Although striking is regarded
as a major weapon by which unions achieve their goals, its
application by public sector labor unions is continuously
declining. According to the Monthly Labor Review, work
stoppages in the public sector are on a sharp decline.
There were sixty-five (65) work stoppages in 19 86, in con
trast to one hundred forty-five (145) work stoppages in each
year between 1947 to 1981. The reasons for the decline
may be 1) fear of financial losses, 2) fear of inflicting
economic harm to their employers, 3) employer militancy in
fighting strikes, 4) fear of failure to achieve strike objec-
37
tives. Scholars are still at odds regarding whether or
34 '
Ibid., 67, on the Hawaii experience of strike
legalization'. •
Steven W. Hays and Zane T. Reeves, Personnel
Management in the Public Sector (Newton, MA: Allyn and
Bacon, Inc., 1984), 33.
36Freeman reports that between 1976-1980, the number
of stoppages in the public sector rose from 32 per year to
500 per year. (Also see Freeman, "Unionism Comes to the
Public Sector," 66). This contradicts a low figure reported




not to strike. However, arbitration generally is still
regarded as a better substitute to strike.
Another important issue related to collective bar
gaining is affirmative action. Bent and Reeves affirm that
the major impact of affirmative action upon collective bar-
op
gaining has been in the area of seniority. Unions favor
seniority in determining promotion and layoff. "Seniority"
is the term used to designate an employee's status with
regard to length of service relative to other employees.
Montilla contends that the application of seniority to
promotions and transfers can severely restrict management
efforts to promote employee development for advancement and
39
supervisory development for future managerial assignment.
Seniority itself is clearly not a merit rule. Its implan
tation in personnel systems suggests that it does not derive
solely from formal collective bargaining. It may be posi
tively related to merit. However, Horton and others suggest
seniority is not consistent with statements of the merit
principle. Lewin and Horton contend that if union demand
for seniority is accepted by management, and introduced into
collective bargaining, then, "that could be cited as an
38Edward A. Bent and Zane T. Reeves, Collective Bar
gaining in the Public Sector (Menlo Park, CA: The Benjamin/
Cumming Publishing Co., Inc., 1978), 332
39Montilla, Prison Employee Unionism: Management
Guide for Correctional Administrators, 25 8.
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example of the inconsistency between collective bargaining
■a. II 40
and merit."
Lewin and Horton argue that
The primary conflict is not, as most have assumed,
between collective bargaining and merit; instead,
the true source of conflict is rooted in the per
ceived interests of organized public employees and
government employers and the administration of the
merit principles.41
For example, collective bargaining may reinforce merit rules
in some instances, and overturn them in others; however,
there is a general adherence among personnel administrators
"to the central notion that collective bargaining somehow
42
poses a threat to merit rules." In fact, in some jurisdic
tions, "collective bargaining contracts supersede local
43
civil service law and rules." Regarding this point, George
Munchus concludes that the growing strength of labor unions
has caused concern and further points out that unions will
undermine or destroy the merit system in favor of collective
44
determination of issues.
David Lewin and Raymond D. Horton, "Impact of
Collective Bargaining on Merit System in Government," The
Arbitration Journal 30 (September 1975):203.
41Ibid., 201.
42Ibid., 202.
For details of negotiability of civil service
rules and laws, see John Burpo, Police Unions in the Civil
Service Setting (Chicago: Public Administration Service,
1979), 36.
44George Munchus III, "Collective Bargaining and the
Future of the Federal Merit System of Human Resources
23
Despite pessimism espoused by personnel specialists
that the perceived conflicts between collective bargaining
and civil service will undermine the merit principle, Nigro
and Nigro offer an optimistic viewpoint, stating that many
jurisdictions have worked out an accommodation between
civil service and collective bargaining systems. They point
out that in those jurisdictions, the two systems have been
fused, and the merit principle has been strengthened, not
weakened. They point out that many traditional civil service
systems lost out in the competition with collective bargain
ing because employees preferred bilateralism to unilateralism
45
and paternalism.
One other factor that can inhibit police collective
bargaining is the doctrine of sovereignty. The problems of
adjusting certain legal perspectives to produce a tolerable
fit with the sovereignty doctrine have been examined closely
in the literature of public sector collective bargaining.
The proponents of the sovereignty doctrine maintain that it
is necessary to "preserve the integrity and legitimate
powers of government.
Administration," Journal of Collective Negotiations in the
Public Sector, Vol. II, No. 4 (L3UZ) . ~~~
45Ibid.
46Sterling D. Spero and John Capozzola, The Urban
Community and Its Unionized Bureaucracies: Pressure,
Politics in Local Government Labor Relations (New York;
Dunellen Publishers, 1973), 5.
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This doctrine was long construed to mean that a govern
ment, cannot be compelled to accept any obligation it shuns
or enter into any kind of agreement with its employees.
Public employers use this concept to rationalize their uni
lateral, unquestioned authority over public employees. They
hold the view that collective bargaining should be seen as
47
a matter of law rather than an issue of public policy.
On the contrary, opponents of the sovereignty doc
trine believe that one of the major tenets of sovereign
power is the authority to make public policy decisions.
Sterling Spero states that "a policy decision by government
to establish collective bargaining procedures in its service
is itself a sovereign act."48 Despite fears that collective
bargaining will infringe on management's prerogatives,
weaken authority and adversely affect efficiency of govern
ment operations and lead to strikes, Stanely declares that
"the era of unilateral, unquestioned sovereignty, is about
over. The age of bilateralism, consultation, negotiation
49
and bargaining is already here."
47Yancy, 'T-he Spectre of Public Unionism from 1966 to
1976: A Critical Analysis of Labor Policies of the City of
Atlanta," 29
48Sterling D. Spero, "Collective Bargaining_in the
Public Service," Public Administration Review 22 (Winter
1962) :2.
49oavid Stanely, "What are Unions doing to the Merit
System?" In Collective Bargaining in Government, eds. J.
Lowenberg and M. Moskow (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, Inc., 1972), 88.
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Nigro and Nigro point out that sovereignty resides
in the people, so if the public's elected representatives
passed laws authorizing collective bargaining for public
employees, they could not be said to be violating the sove
reignty. Despite hesitation by the courts to grant
public employees the right to strike or even bargain collec
tively, the sovereignty doctrine has been redefined or even
eliminated in many jurisdictions, thus encouraging an
increase in collective bargaining. For example, the State
of Hawaii not only allows collective bargaining for all its
public employee unions, but also the right to strike.
Collective bargaining in the public sector is by far
more than bilateral decision making in the private sector.
Citizens' involvement in management-labor relations has grown
to such an extent, giving rise to a new dimension in public
sector collective bargaining known as "multilateralism. "
Yancy writes that collective bargaining is considered multi
lateral when more than two groups are involved in the pro
cess. While mediation and appeals for restraints do not
constitute multilateral bargaining, Yancy states that multi-
lateralsim occurs when topics under bargaining relate to the
50Nigro and Nigro, The New Public Personnel Adminis
tration, 144.
51Yancy, "The Spectre of Public Unionism from 196 6 to




major goals of the additional parties or interest groups.
According to Thomas Kochan, the political and organi
zational characteristics of city government lead to the
development of' a multilateral bargaining process. He-
states that conflict among city officials involved in the
bargaining decision making can give room to multilateralism.
Other conditions that can lead to multilateralism are 1)
management's weak commitment to collective bargaining, and
2) unions' use of strike substitutes, when their political
54
activities are intense. Richard Freeman, however, points
out that, "whether multilateral bargaining yields larger or
55
smaller packages for unions has not been established."
Gordon identifies several advantages of public sec
tor collective bargaining. Collective bargaining allows
employees the opportunity to participate more meaningfully
in organizational affairs and decision making, thereby
preventing management from arbitrary decision making. Col
lective bargaining enhances group solidarity that strengthens
professionalism and greater commitment to the organization,
52Ibid., 51.
53Thomas Kochan, "A Theory of Multilateral Collective
Bargaining in City Government," Industrial and Labor Rela
tions Review (July 1974):526.
54Ibid., 54.
55Freeman, "Unionism Comes to the Public Sector,"
53.
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as a result of collective voice. It allows the public
manager to deal with management functions in all its dimen-
56
sions.
Beer and Spector write that the effects of collective
bargaining depends upon the response of management. They
maintain that if management uses the collective bargaining
process to learn about and improve the operations of the
work place and the production process, union can be a signi
ficant plus that improves managerial efficiency. On the
other hand, if management reacts negatively to collective
bargaining or is prevented by unions from reorganizing the
work process, unionism can have a negative effect on the
performance of the firm.
One should bear in mind that management's ability to
utilize the advantages of collective bargaining is a func
tion of the union's cooperation and participation. Partici
pation, write Beer and Spector, is a way of spreading oppor
tunity and power, with management having the crucial respon
sibility of monitoring and supporting the process of sharing
58
influence and seeking participation.
56Gordon, Public Administration in America, 374.
57Michael Beer and Bert Spector, Readings in Human
Resource Management (New York: The Free Press, 19 85), 110.
Ibid., 60.
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Although a police union's direct sources of power
may include a higher degree of negotiating expertise, the
filing of court actions, lobbying, electoral and disruptive
politicking, alliance with other interest groups, and the
59
use of dispute resolution mechanisms, the bottom line of
bargaining is nothing more than cooperation and compromise
between the two opposing parties. This is necessary in
order to tap the enormous advantages of satisfaction, effi
ciency and productivity emanating from collective bargaining.
59Juris and Feuille, The Impact of Police Unionism;
Summary Report, 6 0.
IV. METHODOLOGY
The research utilized a 'positional1 oriented, data
gathering approach, and the study was conducted from a
descriptive analysis perspective. By 'positional' is meant
that, because of their knowledge and experience, certain
persons were selected by virtue of their positions and
duties in government. This methodological approach allowed
the study to select the smallest, but relevant number of
people who are the major policy actors. They are senior
officials and key representatives from the mayor's office,
public safety commissioner's office, city attorney, police
union leaders, city council members, police officers, some
officials of other local labor unions in the city, and some
community leaders. A total of forty-seven individuals were
interviewed.
The researcher used both structured and unstructured
interviews, direct and telephone interviewing methods. The
unstructured interviewing method had the advantage of allow
ing the interviewees to express their perceptions on col
lective bargaining without any significant interview bias.
The direct interviewing method allowed for immediate feed
back of information from the interviewees. The research
29
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utilized the structured interviewing method to validate
the reliability of information obtained informally, while
the telephone interviewing method was mostly used to take
advantage of convenience both in meeting schedules and in
covering distance.
Information obtained from interviews formed the pri
mary data while secondary data was obtained from books,
journals, newspaper articles and some labor reports from
the Atlanta IBPO file.
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Collective bargaining in the public sector is one of
the most controversial and, with regard to police officers,
the least advocated or supported personnel activity in
government. According to the IBPO's (International Brother
hood of Police Officers), co-president, Chip Warren, there
are three main reasons why police unions need collective
bargaining: 1) equalization of inequities in terms of
salary and promotion; 2) establishment of a workable griev
ance procedure; and 3) the issue of governance. Inter
views conducted by the writer revealed that individual
police officers in the City of Atlanta are yearning for a
collective bargaining agreement with the city. Police col
lective bargaining has implications for both the city govern
ment, the general public and the police themselves. Possible
implications are the impact on management, city budget, and
police service delivery to the general public.
This section presents the major findings from the
analysis of information gathered in studying the perceptions
of selected individuals in Atlanta city government on the
60Interview with Chip F. Warren, Co-president, IBPO
Local 62 3, Atlanta, Georiga, April 19 87.
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potential impact of collective bargaining in the Atlanta
Police Department. Opposition to police collective bargain
ing is an ongoing trend in the City of Atlanta. City admin
istrators and members of the police force are divided in
their perceptions of police collective bargaining in Atlanta.
Opponents equate police collective bargaining with
strikes. They point out that it will have a devastating
effect on the delivery of police service and a divided
loyalty to the city government. They view police governance
as public safety rather than a political process. Enjoined
with the opponents are some members of the police force, who
contend that the impact of collective bargaining will be
obvious on the union's quest for seniority. While they do
not dismiss seniority in its entirety, they are reluctant
to recognize it as the determining factor for promotion
because, "years of service is not an acceptable barometer
of ability."61
Juris and Feuille have emphasized the impact of col
lective bargaining on the chief's ability to manage. The
police chief has responsibility over economic items, schedul
ing, working conditions, seniority as a condition of equal
Roy C. McLaren, "A Survey of the Police Department,
Atlanta, Georgia," International Association of Chiefs of
Police (ICAP) Field Operations Division Report, Vol. 1
(April 1971), 233.
33
opportunity, and disciplinary procedures. According to
Atlanta Police Chief, Morris Redding, collective bargaining
will be a frustrating activity to both the Commissioner of
Public Safety, police chiefs, and the mayor. It will be
more frustrating, especially during this period of fiscal
64
constraints. Chief Redding explains that the police union
will seek to use its union power to severely narrow manage
ment discretion in certain critical areas of authority.
According to him, most unions exist to give monopoly power
to their members.
Charles Maddox acknowledges the charge that "unioni
zation and hence collective bargaining has the effect of
usurping administrative power" from management to unions.
According to Maddox, managers have wdelded this power uni
laterally, and often unwisely, for years. As a result,
collective bargaining will create a check on
managerial excesses by democratizing police
departments afflicted by an organization
malaise which managers have shown no sign of
curing themselves.°7
°^Hervey Juris and Peter Feuille, Police Unionism,
Power and Impact in Public Sector Bargaining (Lexington,
MA: Lexington Books, 1973), 137.
^Telephone interview with Morris Redding, Police
Chief, City of Atlanta, Atalnta, Georgia, April 19 87.
64Ibid.
65Ibid.




Chip Warren, the IBPO co-president states that the
city police force is presently understaffed. The existing
number of police on duty is being overworked, and the city
is saving approximately two million dollars annually in
salary due to understaffing, while the crime rate is fast
rising. According to Warren,
collective bargaining will give the police union
the voice and power to influence managerial deci
sions, to ensure equity and fair play, and also
ensure that budget for police salaries should
adequately be used for that purpose.6 8
In an interview with Atlanta City Attorney, Roy Mays,
he stated that a major impact of a collective bargaining
ordinance in the Atlanta Police Department will be the con
flict with state labor law. Mr. Mays states that Atlanta
would be violating the state law if it enacted a collective
bargaining ordinance. However, when the writer reminded him
that state law is silent on public sector collective bargain
ing, and does not prohibit local legislation allowing col
lective bargaining, he stated that the Supreme Court had
concluded that "neither the state nor its agents can be
forced to engage in collective bargaining." According to
him (Mr. Mays), "it is not feasible that Atlanta will allow
6interview with Chip Warren, Co-president, IBPO
Local 6 23, Atlanta, Georgia, April 19 87.
69Interview with Roy Mays, City Attorney, Atlanta,
Georgia, May 1987.
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any collective bargaining rights to any group of em-
,,70
ployees."
Although certain key members of the Atlanta city
administration do not favor collective bargaining, Deputy
Police Chief, Major Taylor, affirms that
collective bargaining for the police may add to
a better understanding of the public safety and
the political aspects of city governance. ^-L
In an interview with Mr. Tony Zivalich, the impact
of collective bargaining on wages was discussed. Mr. Ziva
lich expressed the opinion that the union is not asking for
more wages. Through collective bargaining, union wage gains
will be minimal, because police salaries are governed by the
general schedule for all city employees. However, the wage
effect, if any, will be seen not only in laying off of city
employees, but in hiring freeze, during a fiscal crisis.
On the issue of promotion which has been suspended since
1982, Mr. Zivalich states that with the establishment of
collective bargaining, the promotion problem in Atlanta
Police Department will be resolved. He also maintains that
the "union will ask for participation in the budgetary pro-
72
cess which will enhance its total compensation package."
70Ibid.
71interview with Major Taylor, Deputy Police Chief,
Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, Georgia, March 1987.
72Interview with Tony Zivalich, Director of Labor
Relations, City of Atlanta, Atlanta, Georgia, March 1987.
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The writer had extensive personal interviews with
Mr. Ray Richard, President of the Atlanta Labor Council.
Mr. Richard does not foresee any potential negative result
of collective bargaining in the Atlanta Police Department.
He rather maintains that collective bargaining will help
ensure that city administrators deal with their police
employees with fairness. According to Mr. Richard,
collective bargaining will help increase police
effectiveness in their overall performance by
enhancing their self esteem, job satisfaction
and upgrading their professional status.73
In an interview with Buddy Fowkes, Atlanta City
Council member, Mr. Fowkes expressed the view that the rela
tionship between the city and thelBPO should be regarded
as very good. He states that "we meet-and-confer with them
74
on certain basic aspects of their employment."
Presently, our civil service law is taking care
of the employment policies that the collective
bargaining can fulfill. A collective bargaining
ordinance will make the city seem like not caring
for our police.7§
Mr. Fowkes maintains that if the city allows a collective
bargaining right for the police union, it will create an
73Interview with Ray Richard, President, Atlanta
Labor Council, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1987.
74Interview with Buddy Fowkes, City Council Member,
Atlanta, Georgia, May 1987.
75Ibid.
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adversarial working relationship between the police union
and the police department.
Contrary to the opinion expressed by Mr. Buddy
Fowkes, several city council members, including Debbie
McCarthy, are in favor of a collective bargaining ordin
ance for the police department. Debbie McCarthy stated
that "it is a democratic privilege that has proven effec-
77
tive in other major cities the size of Atlanta." She
maintains that:
A collective bargaining right will help ensure
a satisfactory working relationship between the
city and its police employees, reduce the turn
over rate, and translate into enormous savings
in terms of police recruitment and training
costs.78
A spokesperson from the Atlanta Mayor's Office,
Melinda Langston, states that "the Mayor will not support
a collective bargaining ordinance for the police depart
ment, despite his pro-unionism." She maintains that:
The Mayor is personally convinced that Atlanta
is not yet ready to bear the huge cost of col
lective bargaining on the City budget, as
suffered by such cities like New York and Phila
delphia."
Bob Fromme, the Deputy Police Chief, argues that "the griev
ance procedures accord the police a fair hearing, and
Ibid.
77Interview with Debbie McCarthy, City Council
Member, Atlanta, Georgia, May 1987.
78Ibid.
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collective bargaining would be a mere duplication that can
cause confusion." That notwithstanding, Chief Frorarae states
that "collective bargaining would be time consuming, result-
79
ing in unnecessary costs on tax payers."
During the writer's interview with .Melvin L. Waldrop,
the Director of Program and Performance Evaluation, the
writer was told that it would be difficult for any person
to predict any specific potential impact of police collec
tive bargaining on the City of Atlanta. However, he stated
that "collective bargaining will make the city bargain with
the police union on an equal basis for every item listed
for negotiation." According to Waldrop, such a relation
ship can foster misunderstanding, mistrust and disagreement
on
between the police union and city officials. Continuing,
he stated that such a situation might lead to strike actions
despite legal prohibition, and that "the huge cost of bar
gaining time coupled with several unwarranted and warranted
demands arising out of bargaining will impinge on the city's
budget." For example, Waldrop maintains that the cxty
79Interview with Bob Fromme, Deputy Police Chief,
Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, Georgia, March 19 87.
80Interview with Melvin L. Waldrop, Director, Bureau
of Program Performance and Evaluation, City of Atlanta,




might raise its sales and property taxes, which might result
in a negative impact on the city's economy. Mr. Waldrop
pointed out that:
In the short-run, police union's participation
in policy decision making may not be in the
best interest of the individual police officers,
because expert negotiators and attorneys would
have to be hired to represent the police union,
and the union members would incur unprecedented
expenses until union members start gaining
sophisticated bargaining skills and experience
in management labor relations.83
While most members of the police union emphasize the
potentially positive effects of collective bargaining to
improve police morale and welfare, most high ranking offi
cers were of the opinion that collective bargaining v/ill
break down the "military ethos" of the police department in
which management becomes bilateral by gradually wearing
away the authoritarian attitude of the department. On the
same ground, Mr. Chip Warren, of the police union, stated
that "such aspects of behavior will help in making the
entire membership of the police force understand that the
84
police are not actually military, but peace officers."
Continuing, he stated that :
The police, the administrators, and the residents
need to interact and understand each other in
order to remove the fears and isolation of the
83ibid.
84Interview with Chip Warren, Co-president , IBPO
Local 623, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1987.
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police from the rest of the society.85
Chip Warren further pointed out that a special part of
police work is to maintain peace in the society.
We cannot maintain peace under fear of reprisal
from the administrators, .while the local resi
dents are also afraid of communicating with the
police.86
The interviewee stated that collective bargaining
will help strengthen the grievance procedure. They also
state that collective bargaining will help accord police
officers with due process of the law.
Limitation of the Study
While the impact analysis of collective bargaining
is extensive in the literature, the impact of collective
bargaining on law enforcement is a relatively recent con
cern in public personnel administration, and that of Atlanta
will be a notable contribution to the literature.
This study, however, is limited to Atlanta Police
Department, and has not been exhaustive in its examination.
For example, the study did not examine the impact of the
scope of bargaining. The study suffers from certain areas
of constraints. Data collection was minimal because of
poor cooperation from city officials. Two major policy




George Napper, did not directly participate in the study.
They were unavailable as they were preoccupied with other
activities, including their involvement with the investiga
tion of Senator Julian Bond's alleged cocaine use. Many
police officers interviewed were not quite knowledgeable
on collective bargaining.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Recommendations;
Despite years of experience with police labor unions,
the City of Atlanta has not formalized bargaining procedures
in its police department. As a result, the existing relation
ship between the police union and the city government has
been confrontational, unstructured and without any written
contract. After a careful review of the potential impact
of police collective bargaining, it is recommended that:
1. The City of Atlanta enacts a collective bar
gaining ordinance in its police department.
2. The mayor appoints a task force to educate
the public and city officials on the in
herent advantages of collective bargaining.
This can be done through the initiation of
seminars and orientation programs on police
labor relations.
3. A written contract be made to formalize the
bilateral labor-management agreement, and to
specify "management rights" of city, scope
of bargaining, designation of the official
in city negotiating team, statement concern
ing when negotiations should begin and end,
and a statement of the methods to be used
to resolve impasses.
Conclusion:
This degree paper has pointed out the potential
impact of collective bargaining and demonstrated that there
42
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is a great need for a collective bargaining arrangement in
the Atlanta Police Department. The alienation and dissatis
faction of police officers, resulting from the diminution
of daily interactions has reached an extent that a meet-and-
confer arrangement with management can no longer formally
rectify the present situation. It will no longer be real
istic to discount the emergence of shared decision making
resulting from the emergence of collective bargaining.
Studies have shown that the impact of collective bargaining
on government poses less of a threat, despite fiscal crises
affecting most urban areas.
Since strikes are prohibited, the police union might
employ other reasonable forms of protest that will not
jeopardize police service delivery when bargaining fails.
These may include: lobbying, picketing, civil lawsuits,
publicity campaigns, fact finding and mediation. In fact,
any serious effort without collective bargaining rights
will place IBPO at a considerable disadvantage in represent
ing the interest of its members.
Finally, collective bargaining is the present trend
in the United States' public sector. No government that
has adopted a collective bargaining legislation has re
pealed it, and there is little evidence that Atlanta will
escape this movement. A poorly paid police force with low
morale may not continue to ensure freedom for all, and the
44
protection of lives and properties. Atlanta's police offi
cers will not be first-class citizens until the city
passes a Wagner Act for them. Such an act would guarantee
the officers the right to bargain collectively for higher
salaries and better working conditions, and in the process,
free them from fear of retaliation.
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ATLANTA POLICE OFFICERS INTERVIEWED
CONCERNING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
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A random selection of police officers interviewed
on their perceptions of collective bargaining in the
Atlanta Police Department:
1. D. L. Brown
2. D. Torchia
3. M. A. Skogen
4. S. B. Jackson
5. M. M. Denson, Sgt. (Supervisor)
6. T. S. Betts
7. J. L. Weldon
8. R. C. Huffman
9. K. Bennett
10. W. M. Byrdsong
11. J. W. Hagin, Lt.
12. C. S. Pyrdum, Sgt.
13. R. D. Kenley
14. L. Bacon
15. T. E. Kiinble
16. B. Render
17. N. F. Sanders
18. M. H. Foxworth
19. D. Roskind
20. R. E. Manuel
21. T. Richardson
22. L. D. Towns
23. A. A. Knazze
24. K. Walker, Sgt. (Squad Supervisor)
25. R. M. Thomas
26. E. A. Thrall
27. A. B. Houser
28. M. L. Hill
29. J. E. Foster
30. J. L. McDonald
31. J. A. Halley
32. R. E. Fox
33. W. Mosley
34. R. L. Stallings
35. B. F. Griggs, Sgt. (Squad Supervisor)
36. L. McCord
37. D. McBroom
38. K. C. Sheffield
39. K. R. Kraemer
40. W. H. Sanders
41. P. A. Thurmond
42. R. L. Starks
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APPENDIX B
LIST OF STRUCTURED QUESTIONS
USED DURING INTERVIEWS
LIST OF STRUCTURED QUESTIONS USED DURING THE INTERVIEWS
How would you describe the present relationship between the
city and its police force?
Do you think that there is a need for improvement regarding
the present police/community service?
Has the city ever engaged in collective bargaining before?
In your own opinion, do you think that there are inherent
advantages to collective bargaining for the police department?
If there should be a collective bargaining bill, would you
support its passage?
If not, why would you vote against it?
Why would the IBPO ask for a collective bargaining agreement?
What were your reactions to police unionization?
How can you describe the present salary structure for the
Atlanta Police Department, relative to other police forces
the size of Atlanta?
How would your union plan on retaining or reducing the turn
over rate in the police department?
Why did it take longer before the IBPO was recognized by the
city government?
Should collective bargaining be allowed in the unionization
of the Atlanta Police Department?
Do you think the size of Atlanta can affect union activity,
if collective bargaining is allowed by law?
Has the city or the union incurred any major costs since the
recognition of the IBPO?
A study stated that collective bargaining has the potentiality
to increase police professionalism. What is your view about
police professionalism?
What is the city's position regarding the present promotion/
seniority problem affecting the police force?
A study reported that between 1966-1976, the City of Atlanta
had been engaging in collective bargaining with several
departments. Why was the police union not included?
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